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Error As A Vice Of Conse11t In 
Contracts 
For the notion of obligation it is very 
useful to refer to Roman Law, where 
the subject was reasonably well deve-
loped. French, Italian and Maltese Law 
on the subject are very sitnilar to Ro-
man Law as modified by French Cus-
tomary Law. Pothier and Domat, who 
were commentators of Roman Law 
were fallowed by the draftmen of the 
French Code and through it we have 
g .:>t the concept of vices and defects of 
con~ent into our Law. , 
The main vices or defects of consent 
are three : EITor, Fraud and Violence. 
French Law also inc'ludes lesion, but 
this is more an element of 'causa' than 
of consent. These vices of consent, 
strictly speaking and with particular 
reference to our law make the contract 
not void but voidab!e, depending on the 
will of the person who has been in error 
or defrauded. 
Generally speaking error means the 
false notion of a thing or contradiction 
between ·an idea and its object. "Wher.e 
a man consents, believing that he is 
co:isenting to something entirely differ-
{ nti he can hardly be said to have con-
sented at all to the actual transac-
tl'.:>:1". (1) In this case there is apparent 
and not real agreement. 
It is very useful to look at the Roma~ 
I ,aw of contracts before trying to deter-
n line what the French, Italian and our 
l.\.ws say on the subject. The rules of 
Homan Law relating to the concept 
cf vice of consent are a compromise 
1: etween the difficult question as to whe. 
t b.er the law is concerned with a man's 
1 eal intention or with the intention as 
he has expressed it. 
There was in Roman Law a distinc-
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tion between 'stricti juris' contracts as, 
for example, the 'stipulatio', and other 
contracts. In the first the mistaken 
identity of the party would invalidate: 
likewise the identity of the subject mat-
ter, but mistakes as to the qualities of 
the subject matter were immaterial. In 
the other contracts the ~ule was that a 
fundamental mistake voided the con-
tract but there was no exact definition 
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of which mistake was to be considered 
fundamental. Many cases were dealt 
with, and commentators distinguished 
four kinds of error - In persona, In 
negotio, In Corpore, and In substantia. 
Error as to the person always invali-
dated. This is not exactly so in modem 
law. The F!'ench Code says "mistalre as 
to the person with whom one intends to 
contract does not cause the contract to 
be void unless the consideration of this 
person was the principal cause of the 
ag.reement." This princip1e is repro-
duced by our law in Sec. 1019 sub-sec 
2. In the second place, error as to the 
nature of the transaction as, for exam-
ple, when one of the parties intended 
loan, the other sale, invalidatea. 
Error as the identity of what was 
sold invalidated, while error as to the 
qualities of a thing was not ignored as 
in the 'stricti juris' contracts, but it 
only nullified the contract if it was very 
important ; that is 'eITor in substantia' 
as opposed to 'error concomitans'. A 
lot of writers think that the distinction 
was first introduced by Justinian 
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"quotes in substantia erratur nullus est 
consensusn. This distinction is not found 
in the sources but in the texts of the 
Corpus Juris and it was applied mostly 
to sale, as for example, a table of 
bronze which both parties think is of 
gold. However, it could even be that 
only 011e party was in error. In this case 
if his error was reasonable in the- cir-
cumstances 'justas et p.robabilis error' 
the concept also applied. Furthermore, 
there is no reason why this should ap-
ply only to the buyer, it can also apply 
to the seller who should, however, 
usually know what he is selling. In 
Roman Law the doctrine of 'error in 
Eubstantia' was probably applied only 
to two cases; When a thing was not of 
the stipulated material and also When 
there was a mistake as to the sex of a 
slave. In modern 1aws this has been ex-
tended to all cases where the quality is 
essential. It is not necessary that there 
should have been any misrepresentation 
by the seller. This would be the vice of 
fraud and not of error. The mistake 
must not be extended to the contract 
it is not what I think I am buying (this 
is my responsibility), but what the 
thing was sold as, that is the material 
factor. 
In modern law we must distinguish 
between proper and improper error. 
The latter occurs where the parties are 
in error with regard to one of the es-
sential requisites of a contract e.g.: the 
object or causa. In this case error is 
only of secondary consideration. P.ro-
per error is error when it acts on the 
consent of the parties and not on the 
other requisites of a contract and'pro-
duces directly the voidness of the con-
tract. A further distinction is necessary 
between 1. errore ostantivo 2. error in 
substantia and 3. error concomitans. 
The first two are essential errors, the 
last is accidental. The first one makes 
a contract void, the second only void· 
o.ble whilst the third does not invalidate 
a contract but allows only for different 
judicial remedies according to the type 
of contract. 
Neither the French, nor the Italian 
nor our Code make any mention of the 
errore ostantivo. The latter is in fact 
derived from natural equity, from Ro-
man Law and from doctrine. This type 
of error excludes and not only vitiates 
consent and it produces the absolute 
voidness of the contract. This is because 
the exterior manifestations which pro· 
duce consent are not in correspondence 
with the interior sentiments. Here the 
consent is void and, although for differ-
ent reasons, is comparable to the con-
sent given by a minor or an interdicted 
person. It is one thing when two people 
or one of them have agreed as to the 
nature or the object of a contract, but 
are in error as to one of its qualities, 
but quite a different thing when the 
parties are in error as to the nature 
of the contract or of the object itself. 
In the f oI"IIler case the error does not 
nullify the consent, although the con-
tract may be annuled at the instance of 
one party. In the latter case the consent 
is non-existent and the contract is void 
and not voidable. Errore oslantivo, as 
can be seen, is merely the Roman Law 
concept of 'error in negotio' and 'error 
in ipso corpore' and also includes, ac-
cording to early writers, mistake with 
regard to the price of a thing. 
Again in modern laws, in which error 
is the principal vice of consent, there 
is no distinction between the error of 
one party or of both, but only a distinc-
tion between 'errore essenziale' and 'non 
essenziale'. While admitting the fact 
that error can have the effect of invali-
dating a contract we must keep in mind 
two considerations. Firstly in order that 
we might hold that error could reason-
ably invalidate we must consider whe-
ther the party in error would have en-
tered into the contract or not had he 
not been in error. Second'ly the rights 
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acquired by the other party and by 
third parties must be protected and, 
therefore, it is also necessary that the 
error must be excusable and determin-
i'ig-. Tb.is was held to te so in tlie' case 
of Frendo vs. Chetcuti decided by the 
1st Hall in 1952 and confirmed in Ap-
peal: "hemm bzonn illi 1-izball ikun in-
vincibili u li jkun ukoll skuzabili. L-im-
prudenza u 1-leggerezza tal-kontraenti 
mhix raguni ta' annullament ta' kun-
tratt". 
As we have already said our Code 
only deals with certain types of error. 
In fact according to sec. 1018 "An error 
of law shall not void the contract, un-
less it was the sole or princ~pal induce-
ment thereof". Also Sec. 1019 provides 
1. "an error -of fact shall not void the 
contract unless it effects the substance 
itself of the thing which is the subject 
matter of the agreement" and 2. ''the 
agreement shall not be void if the error 
re~ates solely to the person with whom 
the agreement has been made unless 
the consideration of the person has been 
the principal inducement thereof. 
As can be seen .our Law only deals 
with substantial error, error of faw and 
to a certain extent with error as regards 
the person. This classification is very 
similar to that of Italian Law and there-
fore what is said about the different 
kinds of error in Italian doctrine can be 
applied to our law. I propose first to 
deal with error of law since this was in 
theory not admitted by Roman Law nor 
by the early commentators, although in 
practice many exceptions were made in 
order to preserve equity. Nowadays the 
questi-on is merely a matter of degree. 
An error of fact is more easily excus-
able but this does not make an error of 
law completely inexcusable. To hold 
otherwise would be unjust especially 
since certain provisions of the law are 
by no means clear. Besides, the philoso 4 
phy behind the maxim 4ignorance of the 
law is no defence', a maxim whicli ap-
plies especially in criminal law, is to 
prevent the law from becoming ineffec. 
tual. This can hardly be said to occur 
when one pleads, and proves error of 
the lew i.1 c~mtracting. Here one does 
not want to avoid the law but merely 
to annul a contract which, in good faith 
was not done according to law. Despite 
this: this type of error was not included 
in the Code Napoleon, which only al-
lowed error as to the substance ana 
that as to the person. Two different 
interpretations were given to this clause. 
The first applied the rigour of Roman 
Law and denied the possibility of 
error of law) 'the other interpeted a 
reference to an error of substance as 
applying both to a substance of law and 
of fact. This latter view is the view fol-
lowed by the Italian Code in Sec. 1109, 
by our Code in Sec. 1018 and also by 
our case law as, for example, in the case 
of Mifsud vs Polidano in 1944, where 
the Court held "1-iZball ta' dritt jikkos-
titwixxi vizzju tal-kunsens u jgib in-
nullita ta:l-konvenzjoni, meta jkun il-
kawZa. unika jew princ.ipali ta• dik il-
konvenzjoni". This however produces 
the anomaly that while an error of law, 
if it is 'causa unica o determinante', 
always produces a vice of consent, an 
error of fact does not unless it refers 
to the substance or the person. 
An error of fact is any error whicli 
does not relate to a provision of the 
law. The Romans, as we have seen, dis-
tinguished between 4error in substania' 
and 'error concomitans'. For them, how-
ever, and unlike us 'errQr in substan-
tia~ produced absolute riuUity aild not 
annulability. This seems to be equiva-
lent to the doctrine of 'errore ostantivo' 
which, as we have mentioned, is not 
included in our Code. When we come 
_,. 
to deal with substantial error, that is, 
error as to the quality of the object, we 
are faced with a variance of opinions 
both in doctrine and in French and Ita-
lian judgements as to what the mean· 
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in.g of "sostanza" really is. It is certain 
that this is the opposite of accidental, 
and means that the object which I Think 
I am buying is so different in one of its 
essential qualities from the object 
which I actually get as to make it prac· 
tically a different object. Giorgi takes 
the view that because of the fact that 
the criterion we adopt is that whether 
the party would have still contracted 
had he known of the mistake, we must 
follow a subjective test; that is of the 
person who is in error, in order to see 
whether 'error in substantia' exists. 
This is the doctrine which we have also 
adopted and which is contrary to the 
objective test fol'lowed by Roman Law. 
It is a just and equitable doctrine and 
has everything in its favour except the 
feasibility of proof. That the doctrine 
of 'error in substantia' has a1so fieen 
accepted by our Courts is shown by 
various judgements of which we may 
quote Portanier vs Dalli of 1936, "biex 
jaghti lok ghat-thassir tal-kunratt 1-
iZball ta' fatt irid ikun zball 
sostanzjali" referring to mis-
take as to the quality of the thing and 
quoting to its favour an Italian judge-
ment (Palumbo vs Giannone 1928) 
which applied as its criterion not whe-
ther the thing was made more orierous 
by the mistake, but the mistake con-
stituted a vice only if it was such as to 
preclude or diminish the use of the thing 
according to its natural destination or 
to that intended by the parties. 
The concept of error as to the person 
is found in the French, Italian, Swiss 
and German Codes besides our own. 
However, in order to vitiate consent the 
identity of the person must be material 
or, to be more precise, the contract 
must ha.ve been conducted in considera-
tion <•f that given person as would, for 
exam·}le, generaly be the case in matri-
monv .. or donation. Where there is this 
erro~· however, Pothier thinks that an 
0 hli:--ition would still lie but based on .. 
equity and not on the coz:.tract. Doctrine 
has interpreted all this as including not 
only error as to the identity of the per-
son but also with regard to his essen-
tial qualities. Here again the underlying 
thought is the fact that I am entering 
into a contract -assuming that per-
son to have such qualities, and, that I 
would not so enter if I knew that he 
did not possess them. However, it is im-
portant to remember that error with 
regard to the capacity of person is 
never excusable. 
A difficult question discussed by text-
writers is in which contracts can the 
identity of the person be considered as 
substantial? Although in the ultimate 
analysis it is for the judge to decide 
whether the 'error in persona' has 
vitiated consent, writers have tried to 
classify those contracts, where the 
identity and quality of the person are 
definitely material. First amongst these, 
for obvious reasons, are contracts of a 
gratuitous title and the contracts of 
partnership, mandate and deposit. 
According to the said Codes an error 
when compromising to be material must 
be an error of fact ref erring either to 
the person or to the object: an error of 
law does not, in such cases, invaffiiate. 
Finally, according to Giorgi, 'error in 
persona' is determining in contracts of 
an onerous title which have for their 
object an act, positive or negative, 
which is 'non fungibile', when we under-
stand the latter as meaning an act for 
the completion of which certain special 
qualities of a determinate person are 
required. On the contrary' error in per-
sona' where the object consists in 'un 
fatto fungi bile', as for example, the 
raising of a wall, or in contracts .~_al! 
onerous title which have for then- oll-
ject the delivery of a thing, does not 
make the contract void. However, even 
i:n thE! latter case, we must make an 
exception for those qualities considered 
as belonging to the substance of the 
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thing as, for example, the buying of a 
manuscript of a renowned author. 
When discussing the question wh~­
ther an error with regard to the motive 
can vitiate consent we are walking on 
very thin ice. Those who hold motive to 
be a determining element and, there-
fo e, an error with regard to it as nulli-
fying the contra.ct base themselves on 
the wording of the Italian Code "che 
non vi possa essere alcuna obligazione 
oenza causa". But the Romans and 
authors of the Italian Code did not 
mean l:;y 'causa' the motive but "j 
momenti di fatto". Puffendorf thought 
that mistaken motive would make the 
contract void and gave the example of 
a party buying horses having been in-
ormed that his have perished. Here, he 
says, the parties tacitly agree that the 
truth of the information is a condition 
for the validity of the contract, and I 
can withdraw if this is proved false: 
only I have to compensate for damages. 
But as Barbeyrac says if this is a con-
dition the contract would be absolutely 
null and 'defectu conditionis' no oam-
ages would lie. We cannot annul a con-
tract, like we cannot a legacy, because 
the motive of the party when contract-
ing or when giving a legacy does not 
materialize. 
Giorgi says that we must speak with 
caution when we say that error as to 
the motive does not vitiate consent. 
The same occurs when we interpret 
'error in substantia' subjectively, that 
is the prime motive of the contract is 
the idea that l am obtaining something 
which has certain qualities. It is for 
these reasons that Giorgi concludes 
"che dobbiamo ritener vera la massima, 
che l'errore sui motivi non vizia i1 con-
senso, purche s'intenda restrittivainente 
a quei soli motivi, che non furono la 
causa determinante del contratto". Willi 
ail due respect to Giorgi, I think that a 
distinction is necessary between the 
motive of a person in contracting and 
error with regard to that motive. If m} 
motive in contracting is a particular 
person or one who has certain qualities 
and it results that I was in error as to 
that person or those -qualities, it is one 
thing, and in the cases allowed by law 
the contract can be rescinded. However, 
it is a different situation if my motives 
for dealing with such and such a per-
so11 are mistaken, even if such motives 
are the determining reason for which I 
contract. It would be highly Wljust to 
make the other party suffer a recission 
of the contract solely because I was 
miztaken with regard to my motives for 
entering into the contract. 
To sum up a few points with regard 
to error generally, we might conclude 
that error has ·obviously to be proved 
and it also has to be excusable. Fur-
thermore a.s we have already said, and 
although some writers of renown such 
as Toullier do not agree, error can be 
uni'lateral as well as bilateral. The lat-
ter condition has never, not even in 
Roman Law, been enumerated as a 
necessary condition for the vitiation of 
consent in any law. On the contrary the 
Swiss and German Codes expressly 
mentio!l that it can be unilateral. In 
this case, however, the injured party 
has on action according to Giorgi 'ex 
delicto' but more probably 'ex quasi 
delicto' on the grounds of unjustified 
enrichment. 
Finally it is important to determine 
to what prescription the action of 
rescission for a vice of consent is sub-
ject. According to our law as exem~ 
plified in the Connatasi vs Tabone Case 
of 1945 "L-azzjoni gliall-rexissjoni ta' 
Kuutratt minl'labba vjolenza, zball, 
qerq, stat ta' mara mizzewga, interdiz-
zjoni jew minorita, hija suggetta ghall-
preskrizzjoni ta' sentejn, meta 1-ligi 
glial xi raguni partikulari, ma tistabbi-
lix preskriz.zjoni aqsar." 
( 1) Buckland. 
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